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One of the most promising of the young Negro poets said to me
once, "I want to be a poet-not a Negro poet," meaning, I believe, "I
want to write like a white poet"; meaning subconsciously, "I would
like to be a white poet"; meaning behind that, "I would like to be
white." And I was sorry the young man said that, for no great poet
has ever been afraid of being himself. . . . But this is the mountain
standing in the way of any true Negro art in America-this urge
within the race toward whiteness, the desire to pour racial individu-
ality into the mold of American standardization, and to be as little
Negro and as much American as possible.1
Scholars of color have created a scholarship that has a black
voice and demands that law pay attention to black perspectives.
This scholarship of color is important for the freedom it provides
to scholars of color to be themselves and to make law live up to its
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transformative potential. However, despite the explosion of work
by black and white scholars concerned with dealing with a perspec-
tive of color, and the almost as significant number of articles writ-
ten with a voice of color, not all those who have written in this
genre agree. I will first discuss the ways that scholars of color agree
about using voice and perspective in their work and then I will
discuss how they disagree. Much, certainly too much, has been
made of the differences among those interested in the voice and
perspective of color, but we who are interested have not done
enough to talk about how we can use that perspective to make law
be transformative. To that important task this paper is directed.
I. DEFINITIONS OF VOICE AND PERSPECTIVE
As a professor of law who is black and a participant in the
debate about voice and perspective in the academy, I feel a little
like the fan who goes to Madison Square Garden and discovers
that during the fights a hockey game has broken out. Unfortu-
nately, a largely useless dialogue was taking place about Randall
Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia.2 This dia-
logue-more like a fight than an intellectual interchange-has
been both counterproductive and obfuscating.
Recently, minority scholars have moved beyond that debate to
discuss some of the issues that animate this discourse. Alex John-
son in a recent article in the Yale Law Journal and in an earlier
one in the Stanford Law Review suggested that it is possible to
end this debate by agreeing on our disagreements and moving on.3
In addition, Leslie Espinoza and Gerald Torres have pointed out
the dangers to scholars of color and their scholarship of defining
that scholarship in ways that are related to race." These efforts are
likely to be unsuccessful precisely because we have used a number
of terms in inconsistent ways.
2. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745
(1989).
3. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Racial Critiques of Legal Academia: A Reply in Favor of Context, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 137 (1990).
4. See Leslie Espinoza, Labeling Scholarship: Recognition or Barrier to Legitimacy,
10 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 197, 199-206 (1991); Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The
Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice-Some Observations and
Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991).
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Some scholars of color contend that there cannot be a
"unique" black perspective, and therefore the notion of a perspec-
tive of color is inappropriate. Similarly, some have argued that
there cannot be a racial "voice" in scholarship. In this view, when
scholars speak they must speak with the neutral voice of scholar-
ship; the race of the scholar is irrelevant to the discussion. Finally,
we have begun to talk about the ways of knowing what is truth,
and how much experience and personal and community knowledge
can or ought to contribute to understanding reality. These are im-
portant issues, but scholars of color and white scholars who have
written about these concerns have confused themselves and those
in the debate by indiscriminately combining these concerns. In this
discourse we have talked about voice, perspective, and truth with-
out agreeing on what we mean. Simply-if it is possible to describe
such situations as simple-describing the different ways we con-
fuse these definitions will move us toward a better understanding
of our disagreements and some possibility of engaging in a useful
discourse. Ultimately, I contend that scholars of color must speak
with a voice of color and may or may not subscribe to a perspective
that is infused by the concerns of people of color in America. Fur-
thermore,- if law is to be transformative, we must bring new knowl-
edge as well as use old forms of knowledge.
A. Voice
All scholars of color have a voice of color. This voice is part of
their identity. To speak with a voice of color is to speak as a mem-
ber of a community who are viewed by others and view themselves
in terms of their race. To speak with a voice of color has two as-
pects that need to be separated. One aspect is the attempt by the
scholar of color to speak as part of some community of color.5 The
other aspect of a voice of color is how others hear our voice in our
scholarship and teaching. It is possible to not intend to speak with
a voice of color, yet have other scholars hear that voice of color and
attribute membership in some community to the speaker. The
color of a legal scholar is not always known, but all of us have an
impression of the scholar's race and gender from the context and
tenor of the writing and sometimes from the name or the school
5. It is important to understand that all people of color belong to multiple communi-
ties. I belong to a black community and sometimes attempt to speak as a member of that
community; I also belong to the community of law and economics scholars and sometimes
speak as a member of that community.
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affiliation of the writer. For example, if we read an article by Terry
Miller of Harvard Law School, most of us will assume the writer is
a white male participant in the legal discourse. Similarly, if we
read that a writer is Leslie Holmes of Howard Law School, most of
us will assume that the writer is a black female legal scholar. We
are sometimes wrong about such assumptions, but to the extent
that identity matters, we make assumptions about the writers we
read everyday.
I also do not mean to make the assumption that any particular
attribute will always matter. Color or gender are not essentialist
tools that always distinguish people. This means that even though
I always speak as a member of a community, I am not always
heard as saying something that has a community context. Of
course, this can happen either because I tend to agree with those
outside my community of color or because those outside do not
hear the echoes of difference that are included in my speech. Both
of these errors occur.'
At this point I know that some are going to contend that they
treat every person as an individual and that though they know that
such individuals have gender, race, and class, these concerns do not
influence how they read or hear what scholars write or say. Schol-
arship, in this view, is a neutral and objective enterprise into which
I and others have injected the politics of race, gender, and class
where it should not and in many ways cannot exist. I want to sug-
gest that while such a society of scholarship might be desired we
do not have such a society today, particularly when we think or
write about race, class, and gender in our scholarship.7
It is no accident that much of the work of opposition to affirm-
ative action is being done by scholars of color who are interpreted
as having found race conscious policies as inadequate and counter-
productive. We-and by we I mean both black and white scholars
and students-listen differently to Shelby Steele, Stephen Carter,
and Thomas Sowell because they are black and appear to reject
affirmative action. Indeed, we know that race is important because
6. The latter occurs for example when my white colleagues read Randall Kennedy's
Racial Critique of Legal Scholarship, supra note 2, as saying that concern for interaction
between race and law are not important or that traditional scholars have in general done a
good job of dealing with race and legal concerns.
7. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. in his newest book has argued that the race conscious-
ness of blacks is new and pernicious. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 80-
88 (1992).
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the authors of these statements tell us they are black and most
white admirers point out this fact. Race matters in the rationale
for what these writers have said. It is assumed (at least by most
white Americans) that those who are black are not adherents of
white supremacy so that we can hear a view of the world unpreju-
diced by the possibility of self-aggrandizement.'
Race and gender clearly matter. Consider the long and rancor-
ous debates in American history between Stanley Elkins and his
detractors about whether slavery had produced a "Sambo" charac-
ter in black people. This debate was not of course about black peo-
ple at all but simply about black men. The myths about black
women are different and equally problematic." The development of
black women historians who were interested in these questions
forced the history profession to rethink its way of examining the
problem of slavery. In a number of fields where race and class are
very important, the race, class, and gender of the observer provides
a check on our ability to be neutral investigators.
B. Perspective
Voice and perspective are not the same thing. As I have sug-
gested above, all scholars, where relevant, have a voice of color,
gender, and class. However, in using that voice, not all scholars
necessarily choose to adopt a perspective that is black. In this con-
text, blackness means a perspective that is opposed to racial op-
pression in the same sense that feminist means opposition to patri-
archy and oppression of women. 10 Just as it may be impossible for
women to always be feminist, it may be impossible for all blacks or
any particular African American to always have a black perspec-
tive. It is clear that some blacks will sometimes engage in activity
that in fact helps racial oppression either through ignorance or be-
cause there may be no course available that is not supportive of
8. It is important to note that almost no one points out that African Americans who
are seen favorably by white society might gain economically from that favorable reaction.
The opposite view, that those blacks who favor affirmative action might gain some future
advantage, is often pointed out, but the other view is ignored.
9. See DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION
SOUTH 17-21 (1985).
10. I owe my own clarity on this point to Paulette Caldwell; see also Jerome McCristal
Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White Authority in the Legal
Academy, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Spring 1992).
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the existing order. In addition, some black people may become ef-
fective supportors of white supremacy because they are afraid to
take a different course. Blacks are not always going to agree on the
activities that eviscerate racial oppression; however, that is where
we must begin to understand the difference between voice and
perspective.
The nomination and confirmation .of Clarence Thomas to be
Associate Justice of the United States puts this distinction in
sharp contrast. Clarence Thomas is clearly black-perhaps
"blacker" both in pure color and in some of the experiences of his
youth than Justice Marshall who he replaced 1 -but President
Bush's nomination and the confirmation muddied the distinction I
have been emphasizing. Because Judge Thomas is black, he will
bring a black voice to the Supreme Court. He sees himself and is
seen by others as a "black" person. He cannot escape speaking
with a black voice, but this voice does not necessarily mean that he
has a black perspective.
A perspective that is opposed to racial oppression is part of
what black people want when they demand black representation
and a black experience on the Court. However, black people also
have trouble reading anyone out of-the fraternity of black people
and claiming that any voice owned by anyone who sees him or her-
self as black is unauthentic. However, if the black community had
separated their concern for a black voice from their concern for a
black perspective, they would have seen that it is possible to agree
that Clarence Thomas speaks with a black voice but to conclude
that his views are inconsistent with a black perspective.
Certainly, a majority of black people do not believe that mar-
ket and natural forces will end racial oppression or that they would
like to accept that brand of conservative republicanism espoused
by Justice Thomas. Despite extravagant claims about the increase
in the number and strength of the new black conservatives in the
national media, these conservatives do not in fact have a game
plan to end racial oppression in society and have had minimal im-
pact in changing the views of black citizens. Thomas is, therefore,
a voice that is black; but it is possible to question the authenticity
11. Justice Marshall's experience as Chief Counsel of the NAACP in the 1940s and 50s
gave him an opportunity to experience the black situation in ways that no lawyer of today
can duplicate.
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of that voice in terms of representing a black perspective without
also questioning his blackness.
To make this distinction is not to remove from voice all of its
power or influence. The race of the speaker, as we noted above, is
clearly important. Being black permits some things to be heard
that are not cognizable when said by a white person. Martin Lu-
ther King's admonition to black people to work hard is heard as a
call to a community he is a part of to persevere. The same admoni-
tion by a white person might be heard as an effort to delegitimate
the efforts of black working people. Similarly, having some things
said by a white person may have a power that a black person could
not generate. For example, President Johnson's use of the civil
rights slogan "We shall overcome" has a power that a black person,
even a black President, could not generate.
Voice has a place in the opportunity for change, but it is a
weak place. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC12 the Supreme
Court examined the Federal Communication Commission's policy
of giving minority applicants enhancements in comparative pro-
ceedings for licenses and in awarding stations in distress sales to
minorities."3 These race conscious efforts aimed at increasing the
broadcast diversity of stations were found by a bare majority of
the court to be constitutional. 4 The majority approved the legisla-
tive and administrative determination that greater minority owner-
ship of broadcast licenses would, in the aggregate, amount to a in-
crease in the amount of total broadcasting diversity.15
The real idea behind the legislatively created rules is that
black and other racially minority voices are more likely to occur if
there are more black and other racial minority-owned stations. The
rule pays homage to voice but does not require a black perspective
from the participants. This means that the rule is likely to be
weakly effective when there is any dispersal of opinions in the
black or other minority community that the majority community
can exploit. However, it certainly has the potential to be more ef-
fective than some other alternatives that simply ignore such con-
cerns. In addition, all alternatives that have the potential for being
12. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
13. Id. at 3002.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 3016.
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more effective, for example selling to community based organiza-
tions or groups, also include difficult issues of definition and
control."1
II. TRUTH AND IDENTITY: THE MEANING OF RACE
It is now possible to understand some of the difficult and con-
fusing debate that a number of our colleagues have engaged in.
Professors Stephen Carter,17 Randall Kennedy,1 8 and Alex John-
son 19 have written about their view of the possibility of racial per-
spective and voice. However, they confused voice with perspective
and ignored their differences about truth and how facts are to be
discerned. It is in these claims about truth that many of the differ-
ences occur.
A friend of mine worked in the Harvard Admission office. Part
of his job was to interview candidates for admissions to Harvard
and Radcliffe colleges. One evening, he described the disquiet he
felt when a student came into his office with a name that could
have been bestowed upon either a male or female. This person, he/
she, did not provide an answer to the question of gender on the
application nor when confronted with her/his appearance, did gen-
der identification become any clearer. My friend proceeded to try
to answer the question of gender by seeing whether he/she had en-
gaged in male or female activities. All his efforts were for naught.
This applicant had escaped with her/his gender intact. The largely
male group of new black intellectuals 'who oppose the use of race in
the academy want to be like that applicant to Harvard/Radcliffe
College with respect to race. These new young black intellectu-
als-Randall Kennedy,20 Stephen Carter,21 Glenn Loury,22 and
Shelby Steele2 3-believe that if black people work hard and do
their thing race will not matter.
16. All efforts to get at group issues through individual remedy have the potential to
have this kind of diffuse effect when the group influence is diluted by the individual remedy.
17. See infra note 24.
18. See supra note 2.
19. See supra note 3.
20. Professor at Harvard Law School.
21. Professor at Yale Law School.
22. Former Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Kennedy School of
Harvard University and now Professor of Economics at Boston University.
23. Professor of English at San Jose State.
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The lawyers in this group have written directly about voice
and perspective. Stephen Carter has been disturbed and saddened
by the view that knowing the color of the author of an article can
help the reader appreciate the article.24 Professor Carter believes
that such concerns move us away from appropriate concern with
truth in scholarship. Randall Kennedy has objected to the possibil-
ity of a racial perspective because he says blackness cannot be de-
fined, and accordingly in terms of scholarship, race is an empty
box. 5 People can have politics, but since politics are not directly
connected to race, efforts to use race as politics are doomed. Alex
Johnson, though not a member of this group of new black intellec-
tuals, has tried to bridge the gap between them and the critical
race theorists. He has suggested that there can be a black voice but
not all black people use their black voices in their scholarship. Alex
Johnson argues that scholars of color either directly or indirectly
signal their color in taking on the voice of color.26
Stephen Carter believes that there is no black perspective on
legal scholarship because race is irrelevant to intellectual discus-
sion, and Randall Kennedy believes that race is undefinable and
accordingly that there cannot be a black voice. Alex Johnson ar-
gues that race is sometimes important and that the author gets to
24. Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White Male" Standards: Some Les-
sons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065, 2065 (1991).
At a conference not long ago, I met a professor from another law school who
writes, as I sometimes do, about the efforts of the legal system to mediate the con-
flicts that arise between religion and society. . . . I anticipated a fruitful discussion of
our shared scholarly interest-until the conversation took a disturbing turn.
My new acquaintance told me that she was familiar with two of my articles
touching on religion and society. But only one of them, she told me, was clearly writ-
ten by someone who is black. Had she known that I was black, she said she would
have gotten so much more out of the other one. Puzzled, I asked why this should be
so. She seemed surprised at the question. It would, she said, have placed the argu-
ment in its proper perspective. . . . Why, I asked, could she not simply take the ar-
gument as it was, evaluating it without regard to the color of my skin? Because, she
explained patiently, she needed a context in which to evaluate the argument. Only
then, she added gently, might we have a real conversation.
I found this saddening. . . . In the guise of bringing us together, I suggested, her
philosophy (and not only hers!) was actually pushing us apart. The reason, I said, is
that she was saying, in effect, "Tell me about yourself, and then we can have a real
conversation." My vision of scholarship, and indeed of life, works the other way
around, shedding preconceptions in favor of something like: "Let's have a conversa-
tion, and that is how I will learn about you."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
25. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1801-07.
26. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Racial Critiques of Legal Academia: A Reply in Favor of
Context, 43 STAN. L. REV. 137, 163 (1990).
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decide when and how the voice of race will be used but that not
everything written by a black scholar must have a particular black
voice. Their descriptions are wrong, and their error stems from
their confusion about voice, perspective, and the nature of truth in
the academy.
These three responses are an effort to engage the group of
scholars of color who have begun to put together an intellectual
community to examine the issue of race. The scholars associated
with this group-including among others Taunya Banks, Derrick
Bell, Paulette Caldwell, Kimberle Crenshaw, Richard Delgado, An-
gela Harris, Linda Greene, Dwight Greene, Charles Lawrence, Mari
Matsuda, and Patricia Williams-have, in starting to form this in-
tellectual community, made various claims about the need for a
black voice or a voice of color in legal debate and scholarship.27
These scholars of color have not argued for a single black voice or
voice of race or color.2 Indeed, one of the most important contri-
butions of these scholars of color, particularly some of the female
scholars of color, has been to point out the extent to which there
are many consciousnesses in every person.29 Such a view undercuts
27. A number of scholars of color have consciously chosen to speak as scholars of color
about legal scholarship. See, e.g., Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the In-
tersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365; Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984);
Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); and Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution:
Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REv. 9 (1989). In addition
two books DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
(1987) and PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) are canonical
works in this area.
28. Sometimes scholars who have written with the voice of color have not been careful
enough to not speak for all people of color, and, as Alex Johnson experienced, sometimes
people do not pay attention to the caveats that the writers have used to make it clear that
no one voice can capture all the voices inherent in the black community.
29. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 9-10. Professor Williams writes:
A man with whom I used to work once told me that I made too much of my race.
"After all, " he said, "I don't even think of you as black." Yet sometime later, when
another black woman became engaged in an ultimately unsuccessful tenure battle, he
confided to me that he wished the school could find more blacks like me. I felt myself
slip in and out of shadow, as I became nonblack for purposes of inclusion and black
for purposes of exclusion; I felt the boundaries of my very body manipulated, casually
inscribed by definitional demarcations that did not refer to me.
The paradox of my being black yet notblack visited me again when, back to back,
the same (white) man and then a (black) woman wondered aloud if I "really identi-
fied as black." ...
I heard the same words from each, and it made no difference to me. I heard the
same words from each but differently: one characterized me as more of something I
am not, white; the other called for me to be more conscious of something I am, black.
[Vol. 38
Legal Academy
the notion of a single perspective even if we choose only one aspect
such as race, because by definition everyone has many aspects. I
believe that what people are really saying in their scholarship is
that voice and perspective are important and more likely to be ig-
nored and avoided in legal scholarship and judicial decisions than
some other important aspects.
Stephen Carter's annoyance with a scholarship of color is mis-
placed. There is going to be the possibility of a black perspective
as long as racial oppression exists, and we will hear black voices as
long as black is an important and distinguishing characteristic in
society. Professor Carter believes that race sometimes matters or
else he would keep all public discussion of his color out of the
pages of the law review and any other scholarly book. The fact that
he has written a book with his picture on the cover entitled Reflec-
tions of an Affirmative Action Baby0 suggests that race matters
sometimes in his scholarly pursuits.
Professor Kennedy's claim that those scholars interested in
creating a scholarship of color have not produced a definition of
blackness and, accordingly, that there cannot be a black legal
scholarship is wrong. He is confusing the claims of black scholars
that black people speak with a black voice with claims that legal
scholarship can be black in its opposition to racial oppression. Pro-
fessor Kennedy is right that it is not possible to deny Clarence
Thomas, Thomas Sowell, or Stephen Carter the possibility of
speaking as a black person, but he is wrong in saying that difficulty
will limit the possibility of a black legal scholarship.
If I am right that all black people have a voice that some may
hear as black or they may want to ring with a participation in a
black community, then it is possible to see Clarence Thomas as
black and as not participating in the community of scholars who
are creating an oppositional scholarship that stands in the same
position for black people as feminism does for women. People can
be heard as black or speak as a black person and not be part of the
solution of the racial problem. Alex Johnson's effort to deal with
these points agrees partially with some of the views I expressed
above, but he contends that the voice of color is something that
I heard the same-different words addressed to me, a perceived white-male-socialized
black woman, as a challenge to mutually exclusive categorization, as an overlapping of
black and female and right and male and private and wrong and white and public,
and so on and so forth.
30. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).
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one can voluntarily put on or take off and that people are writing
with the voice of color when they tell us something about their
racial identity.
People often are confused about the racial identity of authors.
I know, for example, that many people have assumed because of
the intellectual posture taken in the articles and the criticism of
the criminal justice system, that Sheri Lynn Johnson is black.
They hear her voice as black and only change when they discover
that she is white. Similarly, statements made by a speaker or
writer known to be black are heard differently because of the color
of the speaker. Thurgood Marshall's claim that the Constitution
was unfair was treated differently than similar charges made by
Justice Brennan." Conservatives who had not argued for Bren-
nan's ouster did argue for the ouster of Justice Marshall for such
heresy.
It is for this very reason that Professor Johnson wants to em-
power black authors so that they can decide when and how to use
their voice of color, but this view ignores the point he acknowl-
edges in some of his work that the perspective of the listener also
matters. It is, therefore, not possible for a black scholar to stop
being black. Even if said in the most neutral terms, some of what
is going to be heard by both black and white audiences is going to
be influenced by the color of the speaker. A tax scholar who is
black may not be heard as a black person, but that often means
not that we hear him as without color but that we assume that the
scholar is white and male. Voice that echoes the experience of be-
ing black is almost impossible to eliminate as long as the category
of race is so important in our lives.
The point I have made about the racial voice of scholars
means that white scholars also almost always speak with a voice
that is reflective of their position as white members of American
society. This voice also has something to add to legal scholarship
and to issues involving race and law. This voice is nascent in the
opinions of white judges and the scholarship of white legal schol-
ars. In addition, many white scholars believe in various versions of
white supremacy so that they will write both with a white voice
and from a white perspective. As I have defined these terms it
ought to be clear that it is not possible for a white person to speak
31. Several conservative organizations demanded that Justice Marshall resign for his
heretical views of the Constitution.
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with a black voice, but it is possible for a white person to adopt a
black perspective. The problem sometimes is that the white voice
using a black perspective may not be heard by blacks in the way
intended, and not all those who wish to speak with a black per-
spective will adopt conclusions that really oppose white supremacy.
This means that there is no essentialist aspect to racial schol-
arship but that our own imperfect methods of learning and hearing
will make the possibility of whites becoming a part of the move-
ment against racial oppression difficult but not impossible.3 2 If one
reads the scholarship of the people involved in the creation of this
new scholarship of color, it is obvious that there is no sign in front
of the scholarship that says "whites need not apply." The efforts of
males to be feminist, however, ought to give us pause and demon-
strate how difficult it is to adopt the perspective of marginal
groups when you, at least for some purposes; belong to the current
consensus.33 The efforts of whites to use a black perspective are
similarly infected with difficulty but not impossibility.
Professor Carter has contended that it is possible to produce a
racially neutral way of doing scholarship and picking those who do
so. He is concerned that schools might use race to create a kind of
best black instead of permitting scholars of color to be legal schol-
ars. This claim about legal scholarship has two parts. First, those
who adhere to this claim believe that truth can be objectively de-
termined. For example, Professor Carter suggests the use of the
standard for granting patents to evaluate legal scholarship, i.e.,
that the scholarship be new and make a novel contribution to the
existing body of scholarship. Professor Carter contends the use of
that standard for selection of future members of the legal academy
would remove the racial politics from faculty hiring and permit
scholars of color access. This claim assumes that we as a scholarly
community can agree about what is new or novel. Indeed, part of
what critical race theory and black legal scholarship are trying to
do is to create different definitions of what should be considered
32. Gary Peller and Alan Freeman are seen as having adopted such a pose; see, e.g.,
Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 (Critical race theory is the intellectual
child of black nationalism and Malcolm X.); Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest
for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 295 (1988).
33. See, e.g., ELAINE SHOWALTER, CRITICAL CROsS-DRESSING: MALE FEMINISTS AND THE
WOMAN OF THE YEAR, MEN IN FEMINISM 116 (Alice Jardine & Paul Smith eds., 1983) (Like
the male character in Tootsie many male critics attempting to do feminist theory are simply
masquerading as women while using male power); ENGENDERING MEN: THE QUESTION OF
MALE FEMINIST CRITICISM 11-25 (Joseph A. Boone & Michael Cadden eds., 1990).
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novel and not crazy. 4 Professor Carter might be right to contend
that it would be better to argue over whether a particular scholar's
work is novel rather than to concentrate on the author's blackness,
but this does not eliminate all of our problems. Professor Carter
also implicitly assumes that the quest for novel and newness will
be appropriately sensitive to changing the nature of who gets to
teach at American law schools. The purpose of race sensitive hiring
is to increase the black voice inside law schools and to permit the
black perspective greater rein. A neutral standard will not accom-
plish this task if other forces reduce the availability of blacks to
those positions. Professor Carter understands the nature of the box
created by using race but he does not have a path out. Neutrality
will not work because it does not address the changing nature of
truth and knowledge that scholars of color are trying to bring to
the table, and it ultimately assumes that other nonneutral aspects
of the world will not prevent neutrality from working. We know in
lots of situations that this is not true.
III. WHO MAY SPEAK?: AUTHENTICITY, VOICE, AND
PERSPECTIVE
Stephen Carter also questions the authenticity of black voices
from elite legal positions. Why, he asks, should we listen to black
law professors who are not presently members of the black under-
class when they speak of racial oppression? 5 Professor Carter
points out that the black community when surveyed often support
conservative things (for example school prayer and opposition to
abortion), but of course many black legal scholars do not support
these conservative themes.
The question of authenticity is difficult, but it ought to be
clear that surveys are not necessarily the only way to ascertain
34. This is the point that Professor Johnson is trying to make to Professor Carter that
he cannot hear.
35. Professor Carter writes:
My point is not that one who is interested in articulating the authentic perspective of
the truly oppressed people of color must come out in favor of organized classroom
prayer. My point, rather, is that even if there is an authentic "perspective of the
oppressed," I would hesitate to conclude that law professors, of all the various folks
one might imagine, are in the best position to articulate it. If, however, law professors
are going to articulate the perspective, it would be useful first to take the time to
work out exactly what the perspective is. What we should not do is assume that we
know what it is merely because we know what we want it to be.
Carter, supra note 24, at 2077 (footnotes omitted).
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community values. We know that surveys often reflect the views of
the surveyer and are manipulable. For example, if the surveys are
right, it is difficult to see why almost all of the black elected offi-
cials, at least at the national level, are liberal on the issue of abor-
tion and school prayer including a number of black ministers
elected to public office.
The problem is not in the authenticity, but rather in the defi-
nition and the notion of representation. Those who are opposed to
racial oppression will not always win approval for their tactics. If
you had asked a majority of black people whether it was a good
idea to march in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia for civil rights
in the 1960s, I believe many if not most would have questioned the
efficacy of this approach; but it is clear that the black community
was united in wanting to end the racial oppression most visible in
those places. Our job as law professors is not to be representatives
of the oppressed by voting their prejudices when possible, but to
provide legal strategies for change, and to challenge the existing
structure. There is no question that our communities support us in
that effort.3"
The other side of the authenticity issue is the attack some
have made on the authenticity of the new black intellectu-
als-Stephen Carter, Randall Kennedy, Glenn Loury, and Shelby
Steele-to speak for the black community. These new black intel-
lectuals tend to be social liberals unlike older black conservatives,
e.g., Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams, who are economic and
social conservatives. These new black intellectuals do not believe
that the market will save black people, though they do believe that
black people must work harder to take advantage of opportunities
afforded by legal and social change. What is new about these intel-
lectuals is their growth in the arena of legal discourse.
These views have roots at least in the sociological discourse of
Franklin Frazier, but Frazier's views did not influence the black
intellectuals who became legal academics or who sought to change
the law through legal discourse in the courts. Many black scholars,
Frederick Douglas and Booker T. Washington being examples,
36. If black and white groups in America are asked for the causes of racial disparities
in income the answer they provide is highly influenced by the race of the person surveyed.
Whites invariably blame a lack individualistic initiative on the part of blacks. Most blacks
thought that they were subject to large amounts of discrimination that included deeper
processes. See A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 150-52 (Gerald David
Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989).
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thought that black people could prove through hard work that race
did not matter in the market or in the combat for jobs. However,
most black Americans have thought that their African heritage,
their otherness, could not be subsumed in white America. These
earlier black American scholars, despite some public utterances to
the contrary, understood that they were black and Americans. If I
understand the new black intellectuals, they are Americans who
happen to be black. This is a great breakthrough. If it happens to
the rest of black America, it will create the first truly multiracial,
nondiscriminatory society. However, there is an oddness here that
these new black intellectuals have not addressed. Why is it that in
the black community there is less of a belief in their being Ameri-
cans who happen to be black? I contend it is because in order to be
a American who happens to be black, American society must see
you as American first and black secondarily. Despite great changes,
this is not the truth of American society. Race, the fact of our
blackness, remains the mountain, to paraphrase Langston Hughes,
in the legal academy that black intellectuals, past and present,
cannot ignore or get around. 7
Race is one of the two identifying aspects of our society. We
are either white or black in America. Just as most people, the
Harvard applicant a clear exception, are men or women, all of us
have a race in our society. This is not the only way to order a soci-
ety. It is possible to not create such categories of description and
aspiration, but it is folly to ignore their creation here. Our under-
standing of who we are and where we belong is an important as-
pect of our self-definition. Our race defines our obligations and re-
sponsibilities. It helps to define the community that we are a part
of, and it provides protection and support for us in time of need.
These new black intellectuals can belong to the academic com-
munities they are a part of, but they cannot in this society sepa-
rate out their blackness and become something else. This duality
does not permanently disqualify them from their job as faculty
members or academics. The reason why this is true has two parts.
First, black people are black not only because they see themselves
as black but because white people see them as other than white. It
is not possible for black people to emerge free of color when white
people see them as black. To do so is to invite the experience of
large numbers of black undergraduates who have no protection
37. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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from invidious and discriminatory remarks. There cannot be uni-
lateral surrender in the war against racism. Second, race-at least
for those like African Americans who are members of a disfavored
racial group-has the potential to play a powerful role of help in
our lives. Race need not play such a role. When race is forced down
the throats of black Americans, it is almost always in a negative
way. Stephen Carter's example of being denied the opportunity to
compete for a National Merit Scholarship as a child and being seen
as the best black law professor by some of his colleagues are elo-
quent examples of the danger of having others define black people
as the best black."8 However, this patronizing use of race is not the
only way race is used. The new black scholars seem unaware that
race can or does play a positive role in their lives. Indeed, what I
find most odd about the new black scholars is that the life they
lead and the life they preach are completely different. Frederick
Douglass once wrote that we must speak two different languages,
one to ourselves and the other to the outside community. The
problem with the new black intellectuals is that they write about
race as if there is only one community. They understand at least in
parts of their lives that there are at least two and engage in activ-
ity that is directed at their participation in the black community.
What these new black intellectuals seem to want is to have all
the advantages of being white males. They are saying if race were
not important then we could simply be law professors. Free us to
be just law professors and professors of English and Economics.
The problem with this cry is that they keep talking about race.
Race is unimportant. Race is irrelevant. Race is not the issue. Race
is not unique. They also say I am here not because of my race but
because of who I am. They do not understand, or even admit, that
it is not possible to be colorless in a society that treats all people as
if they have color. It is not possible to be a honorary white person
free of the apartheid of the academic system. We have black voices
because we see ourselves, and others see us, as being different and
black. The most vivid proof of this statement is that they have
found it necessary to talk about race. If race were really irrelevant,
then it ought to be possible to find a year in which the new black
intellectuals do not write about race. If race does not limit your
life, then, in the words of my colleague Bill Van Alstyne, get be-
yond it.
38. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 47-69 (1991).
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Two incidents in my career emphasize the extent to which it is
impossible to escape race in our system. I came to law school
teaching with an interest and some advanced education in econom-
ics. I was hired by my first law school to teach labor law and law
and economics since I had studied labor economics in graduate
school. When I began to teach at Duke University, the Dean re-
quested that I teach employment discrimination. Until then I had
an interest in employment discrimination, but I did not teach it.
After moving to teach and write on employment discrimination, I
started writing more directly and thinking about race. When I
came up for tenure, one of my white colleagues and friends sug-
gested that other colleagues might think that I was trying to "mau
mau" my colleagues into voting me a tenure offer based upon my
color because of my writings on race. From my perspective I had
been forced into talking and writing about race. I had been asked
by the Dean to think about employment discrimination law. I was
told that meant I had put race before me. My colleagues may want
me to get beyond race but they understand I am black and ask me
to formally and informally perform tasks because of that black-
ness. I have a number of close white friends on the Duke faculty
but that does not mean we have escaped being racial beings in our
society. Race is important.
The strangest notion is the one proposed by these new black
intellectuals that race does not matter when their own lives belie
this truth. When Shelby Steele writes movingly and importantly
about race, his testimony as a black person provides a power that
no white person in our society can match. It is not that no white
person can imagine the hurt or the uniqueness of being black, but
no white person can step outside the boundaries of our racial pre-
sent to speak as an outsider untouched by the racism of the Ameri-
can present.3 9 Shelby Steele's statement about race being unimpor-
tant is all the more important because he is a black person.
Similarly, when Randall Kennedy writes an article about what
some minority writers have been contending in their articles, he
speaks as a black professor of law at Harvard University. Professor
Kennedy cannot stop being a tenured member of the Harvard Law
39. One example of an exception to this rule is Gunnar Mydral who as a Swedish
social scientist could examine the racism of the United States as a nonparticipant. Much of
the power of that statement came from that position outside. However, most people who
write about the questions of race must be participants in order to understand what is going
on and, therefore, cannot escape to a kind of freedom.
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faculty anymore than he can stop being a black tenured Harvard
Law faculty member. No white colleague would have written that
article, not because some and maybe most would agree with him,
but because they too worry about racism. All of these new black
intellectuals have greater platforms because they are black. When
these new black intellectuals ignore this obvious point, they ignore
the reality that most black people are acutely aware of.
I want to emphasize that I have no personal animosity towards
my new intellectual brethren. I consider Randall Kennedy and Ste-
phen Carter more than casual acquaintances and I know, admire,
and respect their work on a number of topics. They have always
made me proud to share a part of my heritage. I have known
Glenn Loury longer than any of the rest because he too is an econ-
omist, and he and I have co-authored an obscure paper. I cannot
claim to be blacker than them on any grounds that I would find
plausible. Indeed, I have never been able to decide how black
someone was. To me, to be black is a product of self-awareness.
Wherever it comes from it can go away as quickly as it came. If I
am right that they have found error instead of truth, I am sure
that it is because of failings found not just in them but in most if
not all of us.
Indeed, I think the lesson we should learn from the writings of-
my new black intellectual colleagues is that there are powerful
forces that condemn us all to compliance with the norm. (This
does not prove that the norm that society forces us to is unproduc-
tive or nonfunctional for today's world. It is possible that in the
climate of today, black people really ought to follow the prescrip-
tions of the new black intellectuals, but I think not.) When I con-
tend that I do not find the assumptions they have made consistent
with the need for an end to racial oppression, I am making a claim
about my interpretation of what will end racial oppression. I and
those who have criticized these new black intellectuals may be
wrong, but we do not mean to deny our colleagues their blackness
or to misunderstand the enterprise we are engaged in.
Ultimately the differences between black legal scholars and
the new black intellectuals are our views of where society is and
how it will change. These young black intellectuals see the black
community, or at least the part they are a member of, as a kind of
three-hundred year locust who have lived in the mire of discrimi-
nation but who are able to molt and fly with the other locusts in
their time because all of the relevant and important barriers to
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that flight have been removed. Those of us trying to change the
legal discourse by building a scholarship that appreciates and in-
cludes our racial voice and perspective believe that important im-
pediments to equality and justice remain. If we have sometimes
expressed that opposition with too much fervor it is because we
have thought Frederick Douglass was right when he wrote:
With apparent surprise, astonishment and impatience we have been
asked, "What more can the colored people of this country want than
they now have, and what more is possible to them?" It is said they
were once slaves, they are now free; they were once subjects, they
are now sovereigns; they were once outside of all American institu-
tions, they are now inside of all and are a recognized part of the
whole American people. Why, then, do they hold Colored National
Conventions and thus insist upon keeping up the color line between
themselves and their white fellow countrymen? . . . For we do not
forget that they are not only put to us by those who have no sympa-
thy with us, but by many who wish us well, and that in any case
they deserve an answer.
Before, however, we proceed to answer them, we digress here to
say that there is only one element associated with them which ex-
cites the least bitterness of feeling in us or that calls for special re-
buke, and that is when they fall from the lips and pens of colored
men who suffer with us and ought to know better. A few such men,
well known to us and the country, happen to be more fortunate in
the possession of wealth, education and position than their humbler
brethren, have found it convenient to chime in with the popular cry
against our assembling, on the ground that we have no valid reason
for this measure or for any other separate from the whites; that we
ought to be satisfied with things as they are."'
The scholars of color who have built a community around an oppo-
sition to racial oppression remain profoundly unsatisfied with
things as they are and we believe the law has a role to play in any
change. We must learn to use our voices to build a perspective41 on
40. Frederick Douglass, The Color Line in America in THE VOICE OF BLACK AMERICA
491, 491-92 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1972).
41. Throughout this text I have called this perspective "black." There are two dangers
with this use. The first is the possibility that I will privilege one aspect of race "blackness"
when race is increasingly multi-colored and shaded. I have chosen to not change the term to
scholars of color or something more inclusive because I want to not become lost in the many
experiences of people of color in America that are both similar and different. Professor An-
gela Harris has helpfully noted the second issue, that is, that I have defined black perspec-
tive as opposition to racial oppression or as anti-subordination. She notes that an element of
essentialism would be eliminated if everywhere in the text I substituted anti-subordination
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race that includes and empowers, but understands that we must
climb that racial mountain in the legal academy.
or opposition to racial oppression for black perspective. I have not taken that useful sugges-
tion primarily because people talk about anti-subordination in terms of black perspective. I
agree that elements of essentialism could be removed if we thought about black perspective
as anti-subordination. My point in defining black perspective as anti-subordination is to
make that point as directly as possible. But it is important to remember that the was in
which we use language to think about subjects constrains us. If I adopted the anti-subordi-
nation language I would, I think, take a step that many who have written or thought about
this area are not willing to take. The essentialism that remains among those who. think
about a black perspective is the essentialism that says that the way blacks and whites see
anti-subordination is influenced by race. So what they mean by a black perspective is the
anti-subordination of black people as seen through the eyes of the aware black person. This
is a statement about how race influences our experiences as black and white people, and it
means that most black people do not believe that most white people have been able to
adopt an anti-subordination position that rejects the white supremacy that is nascent in the
scholarship of many majority scholars.
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